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Abstract
Current collaborative work environments are characterized by
dynamically changing organizational structures. Although
there have been several efforts to refine work distribution, es-
pecially in workflow management, most literature assumes a
static database approach which captures organizational roles,
groups and hierarchies and implements a dynamic roles based
agent assignment protocol. However, in practice only partial
information may be available for organizational models, and in
turn a large number of exceptions may emerge at the time of
work assignment. In this paper we present an organizational
model based on a policy based normative system. The model is
based on a combination of an intensional logic of agency and a
flexible, but computationally feasible, non-monotonic formal-
ism (Defeasible Logic). Although this paper focuses on the
model specification, the proposed approach to modelling agent
societies provides a means of reasoning with partial and un-
predictable information as is typical of organizational agents
in workflow systems.
1 Introduction
Typical business processes generally consist of a num-
ber of interrelated activities that are undertaken to
achieve business goals. Process management tech-
nologies such as workflow systems provide a means of
automating the coordination and scheduling of con-
stituent activities. The successful completion of these
activities depends on the availability of required re-
sources, most important of which are the processing
agents (systems and/or people). Thus it is critical
that process activities are assigned to the right agent
at the right time. In a highly idealised world, each
activity of a process could be allocated to a spe-
cific agent (or role) specialised in the particular task.
Thus, in such case, the assignment of work-items to
agents could be regarded as a build-time specification,
to be enacted at run-time. This scenario is hardly
realistic. Most of the activities in a large organiza-
tion are executed by a number of agents being placed
at different levels of the organizational hierarchy and
with a different list of privileges/obligations and ex-
pertise within the organization. Of course, due to
unexpected events, an agent may not be available for
a task at the scheduling time either for a shorter or a
longer period of time.
The problem of allocation of the task on hand to
the right person at a given moment of time is in prac-
tice a difficult one. Its effective solution, to a large ex-
tent, depends not only on the mechanism controlling
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the job allocation, its sophistication and intelligence,
but also on the data availability to support such sys-
tem functionality. To obviate these problems, many
workflow systems have referred to an underlying or-
ganizational model in both the design phase and in
the execution phase.
In general, recent experience with workflows de-
ployment demonstrates a great deal of success in the
solutions provided by this technology in terms of pro-
ductivity enhancements in many process-intensive in-
dustry sectors. As with other cases of IT products
reaching practical deployment, there is a complemen-
tary list of drawbacks found in current workflows
systems. One of the limitations is that the work-
flow management systems do not provide an effective
means of dealing with uncertainty and lack of data
availability in resource allocation. (Kumar, van der
Aalst & Verbeek 2001) provides further shortcomings
which are to a large extent a result of the aforemen-
tioned limitation. These include selectivity, that is,
the work is offered to too many, too few, or simply
to those already involved in the work; advanced and
context dependent constraints which cannot be ex-
pressed without incorporating advanced and contex-
tual knowledge; no distinction between soft and hard
constraints, so the systems are not flexible and have
limited support for exceptions; no concept of substi-
tutability or delegation (or other normative positions
relevant to the underlying organization).
There have been some results reported in the lit-
erature to overcome some of the above shortcom-
ings. (van der Aalst & Kumar 2001) proposes the use
of UML, in particular Object Constraint Language
(OCL) to model teams of agents and their relation-
ships in an organization. However OCL and UML
do not support concepts usually adopted in the char-
acterisation of organizations. Similar considerations
also apply to (Momotko & Sumieta 2002), where an
object-oriented language is proposed as an extension
of the allocation mechanism advanced by the WfMC
(Hollingsworth 1995). (Kumar et al. 2001) advocates
some organizational notions (for example, responsi-
bility, authorization, delegation). (Casati, Castano &
Fugin 2001) presents a solution for managing work-
flow authorization constraints based on ECA rules.
What is lacking in many proposals is a clear descrip-
tion of the meaning of various organizational notions.
Consequently the interpretation is left to the intu-
ition of users of such techniques, with the obvious
impact on the automation of organizations. The lack
of models with clear semantics to describe organiza-
tions clearly prevents systematic formal analysis of
organizations represented in this way
There has been a considerable amount of research
dedicated to the development of appropriate models
of automation of organizations, and it is recognised
that the success of those models depends on the adop-
tion of explicit organizational models. We believe
that the allocation of tasks to participants should
be guided by the relevant organizational model, in
particular by the normative relationships among the
agents, and by the attributes (abilities, capabilities,
opportunities,. . . ) of single agents or teams of agents.
In the build-time phase the organizational model is
used to accommodate the evolution of the process
schemas, and in the run-time to optimise the exe-
cution of the process in a variable scenario, given the
available resources.
Consider for example the workflow in Figure 1 in
a typical service support business process1. Such pro-
cesses are found in many domains such as telecommu-
nication services, road vehicle services, city council
inquiries etc. This example represents a hypotheti-
cal and simplified process, wherein, upon receipt of a
customer call, a call centre agent will create a request
with relevant details in the system, and allocate an
engineer based on skills and availability. The request
appears on the work list of the allocated engineer, who
will now have to make decisions on how to resolve the
customer request based on his/her expertise. In typi-
cal environments, the problem is addressed and solved
in accordance with pre-determined procedures. Tem-
poral/control constraints and quality assurance pa-
rameters are associated with these procedures. How-
ever, the engineer assigned at this level may attempt
to resolve the problem, but may not always be suc-
cessful. Thus, in some circumstances, a greater level
of support may be required (so called level 2 support).
The need for level 2 support is identified through a
proclamation of the original engineer. This proclama-
tion will generally include essential instance specific
data such as a detailed problem specification, tests
performed, classification of the problem (Problem A
is of Type X).
Figure 1: Service Support Workflow
Provision of further levels of support is typically
more complex. It is difficult, if not impossible to de-
1The syntax of the workflow modelling language presented in
this example can be found in (Sadiq & Orlowska 2000)
termine the exact response warranted for every possi-
ble customer request. Thus some flexibility has to be
afforded to the engineers-in-charge. The underlying
objective is to effectively meet the customer request
within the given constraints, while making the best
use of individual expertise and experience, and taking
into consideration a number of factors such as avail-
ability, work load, problem classification, proximity
of location etc. In other words, one can anticipate
that resource allocation decisions need to be based
on an integrated view of the instance, organizational
and resource usage data.
For example, assigning an expert engineer for level
2 support would need to take into consideration the
factors identified above. Furthermore the investiga-
tion task may be decomposed and carried out through
multiple agents requiring the notion of delegation.
In fact, various rules of delegation can be applied
in such scenarios, where tasks are assigned to peers
and/or subordinates, these tasks are attempted, and
re-assigned as more results are obtained.
In recent work on agents and agent societies a spe-
cific normative line of research has been emerging.
This research assumes that as in human societies, also
in artificial societies normative concepts may play a
decisive role, allowing for the flexible co-ordination
of intelligent autonomous agents (see, e.g., (Conte &
Dellarocas 2001)). In this perspective, a precise logi-
cal analysis of normative notions such as obligations,
institutions, responsibilities, delegation, powers, etc.,
has been recognised as one precondition for the de-
velopment of norm-governed societies.
In general, we believe that an appropriate formal
model of organization should conceive an organization
as a policy-based normative system; accordingly an
organization should be characterised by specifying
1. the normative positions relevant to design its
structure; these positions include not only duties
and permissions, but also powers, as for instance
powers of creating further normative positions
on the head of other agents. The idea behind
the process of allocating powers is thus necessary
to account for other organizational notions such
as those of responsibility and delegation (Gelati,
Governatori, Rotolo & Sartor 2002). This model
provides conceptual tools for define both the nor-
mative patterns of behaviour of each agent within
an organization, and how the agents can relate to
each other to attain the normative co-ordination
needed to achieve the organizational goals;
2. a notion of agency capable of expressing agents’
behaviour also without referring to their concrete
actions. Specifically, the concepts of direct and
indirect action, attempt, and their relationships
with the relevant normative positions, seem to be
central for describing the organization of a set of
agents;
3. a non-monotonic system that formalises the busi-
ness rules governing and describing the activities
of an organization. The use of an appropriate
non-monotonic system facilitates the formalisa-
tion of the dynamism needed to implement the
flexibility required by exceptional behaviours and
incomplete user’s specifications and profiles.
In this paper we provide a formal machinery to cap-
ture some of the building blocks mentioned above.
In particular, we focus on some basic aspects of
agency and institutionalised power (see points 1 and
2). These concepts are embedded in a non-monotonic
framework to account for the fundamental activities
performed within an organization (see point 3). The
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines a
model of organization based on a multi-modal logic of
agency; Section 3 briefly introduces Defeasible Logic,
and we argue that it offers a suitable and flexible non-
monotonic formalism. Section 4 shows how to adapt
Defeasible Logic to cope with agency and multi-agent
systems. Finally Section 5 discusses some directions
for future work.
2 Institutional Agency
The background of this paper comes from the well-
known Kanger-Lindahl-Po¨rn (Kanger 1972, Lindahl
1977, Po¨rn 1977) logical theory to account for agency
and organized interaction (see (Elgesem 1997)). Our
starting point is to take advantage of some recent
contributions (Santos, Jones & Carmo 1997, Jones
& Sergot 1996, Jones 2003), which have enriched
this framework with some substantial refinements.
As we have alluded to, the notion of agency is de-
scribed in a multi-modal logical setting. Despite some
well-known limitations (see (Elgesem 1997, Segerberg
1992, Royakkers 2000)), such an approach is very gen-
eral since actions are simply taken to be relationships
between agents and states of affairs, and very flex-
ible since it allows the easy combination of actions
and concepts like powers, obligations, beliefs, etc. As
recently pointed out regarding the design of comput-
erised multi-agent systems, such a multi-modal logic
“[is] a means of supplying an intermediate level of de-
scription, falling somewhere between [. . . ] ordinary-
language account of what a system [. . . ] is supposed
to be able to do and [. . . ] the level of implementation”
(Jones 2003).
The paper is confined to two basic notions of
agency and the concept of institutionalised power.
The first of these notions is the idea of personal and
direct action to realise a state of affairs, formalised
by the modal operator E: EiA means that the agent
i brings it about that A. Different axiomatisations
have been provided for it but almost all include
EiA→ A
¬Ei>
(EiA ∧ EiB)→ Ei(A ∧B)
and are closed under logical equivalence
A ≡ B
EiA ≡ EiB .
If these are some general properties for E, a specific
axiom advanced in (Santos et al. 1997) –and adopted
here– to characterise specifically this operator is
EiEjA→ ¬EiA. (EE¬E)
It corresponds to the idea that the brings-it-about op-
erator expresses actions performed directly and per-
sonally. In other words this axiom states a principle
of rationality for modelling co-ordination in institu-
tional organizations: it is counterintuitive that the
same agent brings it about that A and brings it about
that somebody else achieves A. The second aspect of
agency considered here is that of attempt, formalised
by the operator Hi (Santos et al. 1997, Jones 2003).
HiA says that i attempts to make it the case that A.
The operator Hi is not necessarily successful. Besides
that, it enjoys Agglomeration and is also closed under
logical equivalence. Notice that we have
EiA→ HiA.2
2In (Santos et al. 1997, Jones 2003) a third operator G has
The notion of institutionalised power is central for
describing norm-governed organizations of agents and
comes from the distinction between the practical abil-
ity to realise a state of affairs –which is not considered
in this paper (Elgesem 1997)– and the institutional
power to do this. For example, if i signs a document
on behalf of her boss j, such a document is as it were
signed by j only if i has been empowered to do this. In
principle, this kind of ability should be distinguished
from the practical capacity to obtain a certain state of
affairs. The attempt to make a bid may not be suc-
cessful: its being successful, within an institutional
context (an auction), depends on whether that insti-
tution makes it effective. It is up to the institutional
rules to establish whether i’s act, in the conditions
in which it is made, makes so that a bid is effec-
tive or not. According to Searle (Searle 1995), the
rules through which institutions make effective these
attempts are constitutive in character and have the
form “X counts as Y in the context C”. Their func-
tion is to create a special kind of facts, whose nature
is institutional and conceptually distinct from that of
empirical facts.
In their seminal (Jones & Sergot 1996), Jones and
Sergot developed a formal approach to the notion of
institutionalised power by introducing a new (clas-
sical but not normal) conditional connective “⇒s”.
This connective expresses the “counts as” connection
holding in the context of an institution s. In par-




represent respectively i’s institutional power to pro-
duce B when A is realised and i’s power to perform
an action as if something else were made by j (see
(Jones & Sergot 1996, Jones 2003)).
Similarly, but more closely to Searle’s intuition,
(Governatori, Gelati, Rotolo & Sartor 2002, Gelati
et al. 2002) argue that the counts-as link is composed
by a normative conditional V corresponding at least
to cumulative logic (system CU (Artosi, Governatori
& Rotolo 2002)) plus the modality Ds –introduced in
(Jones & Sergot 1996) but with a different meaning–
to represent institutional facts. In this perspective,
A⇒s B =def (AV DsB) ∧ (DsAV DsB).
The idea behind the above definition of the counts-as
link is that we want to capture the fact that counts-as
rules may specify when (1) a brute fact (e.g., destroy-
ing the receipt) counts as a type of institutional act
(e.g., freeing the debtor from his obligation), and (2)
an institutional act (e.g., a contract made by person
j in the name of person k) has the same effects of an-
other institutional act (e.g., a contract made by k).
Ds represents the domain of institutional facts and so
it cannot be a normal modality. In fact, the weaken-
ing of counts-as consequents is not acceptable in the
setting of (Governatori et al. 2002, Gelati et al. 2002)
since, from
Ds(making a bid)
been also defined, corresponding to the idea of indirect successful
action. The reading of GiA is that i ensures that A. G enjoys the
same general properties of E. However, instead of (EE¬E), it is
adopted GiGjA → GiA (GGG). (GGG) differentiates G from E
insofar as the former is meant to represent indirect actions. This
operator will not be considered explicitly here. Besides its most
general reading, it can be argued that GiA, if strictly analysed
in terms of agency, can be thought as any iteration of the form
EiEi1 . . . EinA, where n ≥ 0. Notice that this specific reading
of G is compatible with that originally assigned to it, since the
schemas EiA → GiA, EiEjA → EiGjA and GiEjA → GiGjA
are adopted in (Santos et al. 1997).
should not follow
Ds(making a bid ∨ drinking some water).
In this sense, Ds is a non-normal modality closed un-
der logical equivalence and satisfying Agglomeration
DsA ∧DsB → Ds(A ∧B)
and Consistency
¬Ds⊥.
Of course, necessitation does not hold: it sounds
strange that > is an institutional fact for any institu-
tion s. Finally, notice that the axiom
DsEiA→ DsA
guarantees successfulness also within the domain of
every institution s.
Basically, we will follow here the intuitions pre-
sented in (Governatori et al. 2002, Gelati et al. 2002).
Though in different perspectives, however, an impor-
tant point shared by (Jones & Sergot 1996, Jones
2003) and (Governatori et al. 2002, Gelati et al. 2002)
is that the counts-as link is defeasible. This is a cru-
cial feature of this notion. In fact, it is intuitive that,
e.g., if the agent i raises one hand, this may count as
making a bid but this does not hold if i raises one
hand and scratches his own head.
In a more general perspective, notice that the
above framework is able to capture some compos-
ite concepts regarding the normative co-ordination of
agents. For example, (Governatori et al. 2002, Gelati
et al. 2002) show that the introduction of the no-
tion of proclamation allows to account for the ideas
of declarative power and delegation.
The idea of delegation plays an important role in
this setting. To delegate means basically to entrust
a representative to act on behalf of someone else. As
pointed out by (Castelfranchi & Falcone 1998), the
very notion of agent makes itself explicit reference
to delegation. The allocation of tasks via delegation
may be articulated according to different strategies
and levels. A task is in fact a goal that can be de-
composed through a plan into a set of the sub-goals
to be realised by different agents. Second, different
forms of delegation may be specified on the basis of
the cognitive characterisation of the agents involved
in the process, i.e., on the kind of interaction between
the delegating agent and the delegated one (i and j
respectively). In (Castelfranchi & Falcone 1998), for
example, it is argued that delegation is
(a) weak, when there is no agreement, request or in-
fluence and i just exploits a fully autonomous
action of j,
(b) mild, when it is based on induction, namely on
the active indirect achievement by i of the task,
(c) strict, where there is an explicit agreement be-
tween i and j.
In addition, delegation may be close or open, depend-
ing on the degree of specification of the tasks assigned,
namely on the level of granularity of them in the plan.
We will not explore here these issues, which would
require a much more complex logical framework than
that developed in the subsequent sections.
More important, the idea of delegation, insofar as
it is applied to workflows, will be analysed within a
non-intention-based approach. No reference is made
here to the notion of cognitive agent (with its be-
liefs, intentions, desires, etc.), since delegation is
viewed as a purely normative concept in a policy-
based system. Normative delegation is usually asso-
ciated with normative co-ordination, i.e., with a spe-
cific way of achieving co-ordination by the allocation
of normative positions (Norman & Reed 2001, Gelati
et al. 2002, Governatori et al. 2002). This happens
when, for example, a manager, entrusted with a cer-
tain task, can design a multi-agent plan for achieving
this task by assigning duties to subordinated agents.
Notice that the allocation of duties –which is not con-
sidered in this paper– is not the fundamental notion in
this process. The key concept is that of power. This
holds not only for the obvious reason that the alloca-
tion of duties requires the power to do this. Rather,
it is intuitive to say that the idea of normative delega-
tion takes place just when an agent entrusts its rep-
resentative to act on its behalf and the allocation of
this task or goal corresponds to conferring the power
to achieve it.
The logical representation of this institutional
power has a counts-as structure. However, as empha-
sised in (Gelati et al. 2002, Governatori et al. 2002)
(cf. (Norman & Reed 2001, Norman & Reed 2002))
an important role is also played by agent communica-
tion concepts. Recently, the link between speech acts
theory and normative positions has been widely in-
vestigated (cf. (Jones 1990, Castelfranchi, Dignum,
Catholijn & Treur 2000, Singh 1999, Colombetti
2000). In (Gelati et al. 2002, Governatori et al. 2002)
it is defined a unique speech act (proclaiming) to
model all speech acts characterised by a world to word
direction of fit, that is all speech acts which are in-
tended to modify the institutional world. Such a no-
tion is formalised by the modal operator proc. Its
logic is characterised by some very minimal proper-
ties: it is closed under logical equivalence and includes
at least the axiom
(prociA ∧ prociB) ≡ proci(A ∧B).
Of course, proc is not necessarily successful. prociA
is just an attempt to achieve A:
prociA→ HiA.
Whether it is successful or not, within a certain insti-
tution s, depends on whether s makes it effective by
means of appropriate counts-as rules.
This minimal characterisation permits to provide
proc with a new reading that is suitable to model
workflows settings. In particular proc can be used
to model “declarative data flow” intended to sup-
plement or override previous (system) decisions and
procedures. For example, in the scenario depicted in
Figure 1, a call-centre operator classifies a customer
request according to a well-defined procedure. Let us
say that she classifies a particular request as a prob-
lem of type A. As a result a task will be assigned
to an engineer specialized in problems of type A. Af-
ter a preliminary analysis the engineer realizes that
the request has been misclassified, and that it does
not fall in the realm of her main expertise; therefore
the task cannot be completed successfully. However,
the engineer has a better understanding of the field
than the call-centre operator and she is in a position
to offer a better classification. Thus she can over-
ride the previous classification by proclaiming that
the problem is of a different type, let us say of type
B (procEType B).
Another important issue is that the combination
of proc and the counts-as link enables us to capture
two forms of normative delegation, intended as kinds
of true representation (Gelati et al. 2002). The first
is:
procj(prociA)⇒s Ej(prociA) (1)
that is, when j proclaims that i proclaims that A,
this counts as j making so that i proclaims that A3.
In addition, we can have:
procj(EiA)⇒s Ej(EiA) (2)
This type of representation is necessary when the rep-
resentative substitutes a principal which would not be
able to perform directly the activity delegated to the
representative.
Back to the example in Figure 1, let us suppose
that the supervisor is responsible for writing the re-
port. However, for routine reports he might delegate
this task to the engineering who has worked on the
problem. This particular type of delegation is repre-
sented by the statement:
procs(Eereport ready)⇒s Es(Eereport ready) (3)
Now all the supervisor has to do to delegate this task
is just to proclaim that the engineer has to prepare
the report, i.e., procs(Eereport ready).
In the next sections we develop a computational
framework, based on Defeasible Logic, able to treat
the basic mechanisms of institutional agency. Al-
though (Jones & Sergot 1996, Jones 2003) and
(Governatori et al. 2002, Gelati et al. 2002) provide
an interesting analysis, they can hardly be used di-
rectly for implementation. This is clearly due at least
to the well known computational limits of conditional
logics (see, e.g., (Artosi et al. 2002)). In this perspec-
tive, some basic patterns of defeasible reasoning will
be extended to account for the institutional dynam-
ics insofar as they are interplayed with the notions of
direct action and attempt.
3 Overview of Defeasible Logic
Defeasible Logic is a simple, efficient but flexible non-
monotonic formalism which has been proven able to
deal with many different intuitions of non-monotonic
reasoning (Antoniou, Billington, Governatori, Maher
& Rock 2000), has been applied in many fields in
the last few years. Here we propose a non-monotonic
logic of agency based on the framework for Defeasible
Logic developed in (Antoniou, Billington, Governa-
tori & Maher 2000).
It is not possible to give here a complete formal
description of the logic. We hope to give enough in-
formation to make the discussion intelligible and we
refer the reader to (Nute 1987, Antoniou, Billington,
Governatori & Maher 2001) for more thorough treat-
ments. As usual with non-monotonic reasoning, we
have to specify 1) how to represent a knowledge base
and 2) the inference mechanism.
Accordingly a defeasible theory D is a structure
(F,R,>) where F is a finite set of facts, R a finite set
of rules (either strict, defeasible, or defeater), and >
a binary relation (superiority relation) over R.
Facts are indisputable statements. Strict rules are
rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises
are indisputable so is the conclusion; defeasible rules
are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence;
and defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw
any conclusions. Their only use is to prevent some
conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat
some defeasible rules by producing evidence to the
contrary. The superiority relation among rules is used
to define priorities among rules, that is, where one
rule may override the conclusion of another rule.
A rule r consists of its antecedent (or body) A(r)
(A(r) may be omitted if it is the empty set) which
3Of course, the achievement of A will depend on the presence
on another rule which states that prociA counts as EiA
is a finite set of literals, an arrow, and its consequent
(or head) C(r) which is a literal. Given a set R of
rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by
Rs, the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd,
the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd, and the set of
defeaters in R by Rdft. R[q] denotes the set of rules
in R with consequent q. If q is a literal, ∼q denotes
the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p
then ∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then ∼q is p).
A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have
one of the following four forms:
+∆q meaning that q is definitely provable in D (i.e.,
using only facts and strict rules).
−∆q meaning that we have proved that q is not defi-
nitely provable in D.
+∂q meaning that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q meaning that we have proved that q is not defea-
sibly provable in D.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation
(or proof) in D. A derivation is a finite sequence
P = (P (1), . . . , P (n)) of tagged literals satisfying four
conditions (which correspond to inference rules for
each of the four kinds of conclusion). P (1..n) denotes
the initial part of the sequence P of length n
+∆: If P (n+ 1) = +∆q then
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rs[q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P (1..n).
−∆: If P (n+ 1) = −∆q then
(1) q /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rs[q]∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P (1..n).
The definition of ∆ describes just forward chaining of
strict rules. For a literal q to be definitely provable
we need to find a strict rule with head q, of which
all antecedents have already been definitely proved.
And to establish that q cannot be proven definitely
we must establish that for every strict rule with head q
there is at least one antecedent which has been shown
to be non-provable.
+∂: If P (n+ 1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..n) or
(2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..n) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P (1..n) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..n) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(t) : t > s and
+∂a ∈ P (1..n).
Let us work through this condition. To show that q
is defeasibly provable we have two choices: (1) We
show that q is already definitely provable; or (2) we
need to argue using the defeasible part of D as well.
In particular, we require that there must be either a
strict or a defeasible rule with head q which can be
applied (2.1). But now we need to consider possible
“attacks”, i.e., reasoning chains in support of ∼q. To
be more specific: to prove q defeasibly we must show
that ∼q is not definitely provable (2.2). Also (2.3)
we must consider the set of all rules which are not
known to be inapplicable and which have head ∼q
(note that here we consider defeaters, too, whereas
they could not be used to support the conclusion q;
this is in line with the motivation of defeaters given
earlier). Essentially each such rule s attacks the con-
clusion q. For q to be provable, each such rule s must
be counterattacked by a rule t with head q with the
following properties: (i) t must be applicable at this
point, and (ii) t must be stronger than s. Thus each
attack on the conclusion q must be counterattacked
by a stronger rule. In other words, r and the rules
t form a team (for q) that defeats the rules s. In an
analogous manner we can define −∂q as
−∂: If P (n+ 1) = −∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1..n) and
(2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q]∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..n) or
(2.2) +∆∼q ∈ P (1..n) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1..n) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either t 6> s or
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..n).
The purpose of the −∂ inference conditions is to es-
tablish that it is not possible to prove +∂. This rule
is defined in such a way that all the possibilities for
proving +∂q (for example) are explored and shown to
fail before −∂q can be concluded. Thus conclusions
tagged with −∂ are the outcome of a constructive
proof that the corresponding positive conclusion can-
not be obtained.
Sometimes all we want to know is whether a lit-
eral is supported, that is if there is a chain of reasoning
that would lead to a conclusion in absence of conflicts.
This notion is captured by the following proof condi-
tions:
+Σ: if P (n+ 1) = +Σp then
(1) +∆p ∈ P (1..n) or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rsd[p] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +Σa ∈ P (1..n).
−Σ: if P (n+ 1) = −Σp then
(1) −∆p ∈ P (1..n) and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rsd[p]∃a ∈ A(r) : −Σa ∈ P (1..n).
The notion of support corresponds to monotonic
proofs using both the monotonic (strict rules) and
non-monotonic (defeasible rules) parts of defeasible
theories.
The inference conditions for a negative proof tag
are derived from the inference conditions for the cor-
responding positive proof tag by applying the Prin-
ciple of Strong Negation introduced in (Antoniou,
Billington, Governatori & Maher 2000). The strong
negation of a formula is closely related to the func-
tion that simplifies a formula by moving all negations
to an innermost position in the resulting formula and
replaces the positive tags with the respective negative
tags and vice-versa. Accordingly, in what follows, we
will list only the positive version of the inference rules.
4 A Defeasible Logic of Institutional Agency
As we have seen in Section 2 multi-modal logics have
been put forward to capture the intensional nature of
(institutional) agency. Usually multi-modal logics are
extensions of classical propositional logic with some
intensional operators. Thus any multi-modal logic
should account for three components:
1. the underlying logical structure of the proposi-
tional base;
2. the logic behaviour of the modal operators; and
3. the relationships among the modal operators.
Alas, as is well-known, classical propositional logic
is not well suited to deal with real life scenarios.
The main reason is that the descriptions of real-life
cases are, very often, partial and somewhat unreli-
able. In such circumstances classical propositional
logic might produce counterintuitive results insofar
as it requires complete and consistent information.
Hence modal logics based on classical propositional
logic are doomed to suffer from the same problems.
On the other hand the logic should specify how
modalities can be introduced and manipulated. Some
common rules for modalities are,
` ϕ
` 2ϕNecessitation
` ϕ ⊃ ψ
` 2ϕ ⊃ 2ψRM
Both dictate conditions for introducing modalities in
contrast with the analysis of institutional agency as
outlined in Section 2. To comply with the properties
of this notion, in the setting provided by Defeasible
Logic we have to set 1) the rules describing the logical
inferences and 2) the rules to introduce the modal
operators of agency Ei (the agent i brings it about
that), and Hi (the agent i attempts). Accordingly we
will consider two types of rules (strict, defeasible, and
defeaters): a set of rules for the notion of counts-as,
and a set of rules for the notion of results-in.
Since we want to be able to reason about actions
we extend the language of Defeasible Logic with a
set of action symbols; we will use αi, βi, γi to denote
atomic actions. The intended meaning of an action
symbol, for example αi, is that the action correspond-
ing to it has been performed by agent i, while we use
¬αi to denote that the action described by αi has not
been performed. Given the modal operators Ei, Hi,
and proci we form new literals as follows: i) if l is a
literal then procil is a literal; ii) if l is a literal then
Eil, ¬Eil, Hil and ¬Hil are literals if l is different
from Eim, ¬Eim, Him and ¬Him, for some literal
m.
In this perspective a defeasible institutional action
theory is a structure
I = (A,F,Rc, {Ri}i∈A, >)
where, A is a finite set of agents, F is a set of facts, Rc
is a set of counts-as rules (i.e.,→c,⇒c,;c), {Ri}i∈A
is a family of sets of results-in rules (i.e., →i, ⇒i,
;i for each agent i ∈ A), and >, the superiority
relation, is a binary relation over the set of rules (i.e.,
> ⊆ (Rc ∪RA)2), where RA = ⋃i∈ARi.
The intuition is that, given an institution, F con-
sists of the description of the raw institutional facts,
either in form of states of affairs (literal and modal
literal) and actions that have been performed. Rc
describes the basic inference mechanism internal to
an institution, while RA encodes the transitions from
state to state occurring as the results of actions per-
formed by the agents within the organization4. Tech-
nically the rules in RA are used to introduce modal
operators. To correctly capture these notions we im-
pose some restrictions on the form of rules: literals
of the form Eil, ¬Eil, Hil and ¬Hil are not permit-
ted in the consequent of results-in rules for i, while
actions symbols are not permitted in the consequent
of results-in rules. The first restriction is motivated
from the fact that 1) results-in rules are the rules to
introduce the modalities and in the present context
sequences of modalities for the same agent are mean-
ingless 2) counts-as rules make possible the derivation
of institutional actions (modalised literals) only when
they follow from specific actions (intentionally) per-
formed by the agent. The second restriction is due
to the idea that results-in rules describe the results of
actions, not actions themselves.
4Accordingly, counts-as rules correspond to the case DsA V
DsB mentioned in Section 2. Roughly speaking, the case A V
DsB will be treated as a special kind of results-in rule, where the
manipulation of the consequent is made under the constraints de-
signed to account for the idea of institutional consequence. In this
sense, no reference to the modality Ds is required in this setting.
At any rate, this fact will be clear when we will give the definitions
of the proof conditions.
Let us see by means of some examples the intuition
behind this formalism. We focus here on defeasible
rules but similar remarks can be applied to the other
kinds of rules. Suppose the agents e (engineer) and s
(supervisor) are acting in the context of the workflow
of Figure 1. As we have seen in Section 2, the notion
of delegation corresponds to a counts-as rule where
the antecedent is a particular type of proclamation.
Accordingly the rule5
procs(Eereport ready)⇒c Es(Ee(report ready))
represents the eventuality that a supervisor delegates
the writing of the report to the engineer who worked
on the problem.
prepare reporte, procs(Eereport ready)
⇒s report ready
This rule is an example corresponding to the intro-
duction of the modality Es. In fact, the fulfilment
of the conditions in the antecedent produces the oc-
currence of report ready : e’s action of writing the
report when delegated by his supervisor has the re-
sult that s has prepared the report. Formally the
derivation of report ready permits the introduction
of Es(report ready).
procs(Eereport ready)⇒s ¬report ready
The example above does not specify any action in the
antecedent (empty action). This means that e’s re-
fraining from doing any action, when delegated to do
it, has the result to keep the problem unsolved. In
logical terms, also this case can lead to the introduc-
tion of Es6.




This rule says that e’s action of writing the report
counts as the action of s of writing the report.
procs(Eereport ready),prepare reporte
⇒c report ready
This rule is an example of the institutional analogous
of a results-in rule, where an action and a state of
affairs occur respectively in their antecedent and con-
sequent. In this case the result is an institutional
fact and follows by convention only within the insti-
tution. That the report is ready is a consequence of
e’s writing it is not a simple matter of e’s action and
s delegation. The attempt of e to prepare the report
is effective only if the institution recognises this.
We are now ready to give the definitions of the
proof conditions. For counts-as derivability (Rc) we
assume the basic conditions of Defeasible Logic given
in Section 3. Thus ±∆c, ±∂c correspond, respec-
tively, to ±∆ and ±∂.
The conditions for derivations involving results-in
rules are more complicated since we have to cater for
more possibilities. First of all we have that I ` Eip if
either I ` +∆ip or I ` +∂ip, and I ` Hip if I ` +Σip.
In other words it is possible to derive Eip if we have
5Bold type expressions correspond to action symbols, the itali-
cised ones to state of affairs.
6The ideas of empty action and refraining from a doing a specific
action should not be confused with ¬EiA; as we will see, this
corresponds to the non-derivability of A within I, which can depend
also on reasons that have nothing to do with i’s refraining from
acting to realise A.
either a strict of defeasible derivation of p using both
results-in and counts-as rules, and that agent i (in an
institution I) attempts p (Hip) if I supports p using
counts-as ad results-in rules. The output of a results-
in rule produces Ei modal literals, and we have seen
in Section 2 that the Ei operator is a success operator;
therefore we add the conditions that it is possible to
derive +∆cp from +∆ip and +∂cp from +∂ip.
In the same way we have that −∂ip corresponds
to ¬Eip and −Σip to ¬Hip. This is in agreement
with the principle of strong negation used to define
the inference conditions.
+∆i: if P (n+ 1) = +∆ip then
(1) Eip ∈ F ; or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rcs[p] ∀a, α ∈ A(r):
+∆ia,+∆cα ∈ P (1..n); or
(3) ∃r ∈ Ris[p] ∀a,Ejb, α ∈ A(r):
+∆ca,+∆jb,+∆cα ∈ P (1..n).
To prove an indefeasible brings-it-about, we need ei-
ther that it is given as a fact (1), or that we have a
strict rule for results-in (an irrevocable policy) whose
antecedent is indisputable (3). However we have an-
other case (2): if an agent knows that B is an indis-
putable consequence of A in the institution (it always
is the case that A counts as B), and it produces A,
then it must realise B. This is in contrast with the
NML interpretation whereby the agent has to bring
about all consequences of his/her actions.
+Σi: if P (n+ 1) = +Σip then
(1) Eip ∈ F ; or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rcsd[p] ∀a, α ∈ A(r):
+Σia,+Σcα ∈ P (1..n); or
(3) ∃r ∈ Risd[p] ∀a,Ejb, α ∈ A(r):
+Σca,+Σjb,+Σcα ∈ P (1..n).
The inference conditions for Hi are very similar to
those for strong brings-it-about; essentially they are
monotonic proofs using both the monotonic part
(strict rules) and the supportive non-monotonic part
(defeasible rules) of a defeasible institutional action
theory.
To capture the results of defeasible actions we have
to use the superiority relations to resolve conflicts.
Thus the inference conditions for +∂i are as follows:
+∂i: if P (n+ 1) = +∂ip then
(1) +∆ip ∈ P (1..n) or
(2.1) −∆c∼p,−∆i∼p ∈ P (1..n) and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ Rcsd[p] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂ia ∈ P (1..n), or∃r ∈ Risd[p] ∀Ejb, a, α ∈ A(s):
+∂jb,+∂ca,+∂cα ∈ P (1..n); and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼p] ∪Ri[Ekp] either
(2.3.1) ∃α ∈ A(s) : −∂cα ∈ P (1..n), or
(2.3.2) if s ∈ Rc[∼p] then ∃a ∈ A(s):
−∂ca ∈ P (1..n); and
if s ∈ RA[∼p] ∪Ri[Ekp] then either
∃Eja ∈ A(s) : −∂ja ∈ P (1..n) or
∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂ca ∈ P (1..n); or
(2.3.3) ∃t ∈ R[p] such that t > s and
∀α ∈ A(t) : +∂cα ∈ P (1..n) and
if t ∈ Rc[p] then ∀a ∈ A(t):
+∂ca ∈ P (1..n); and
if t ∈ Ri[p] then ∀a,Ejb ∈ A(t):
+∂ca,+∂ja ∈ P (1..n).
The conditions for proving the results of defeasible
actions are essentially the same as those given for
defeasible derivations in Section 3. The only differ-
ence is that at each stage we have to check for two
cases, namely: (1) the rule used is a results-in rule;
(2) the rule is a counts-as rule. In the first case we
have to verify that factual antecedents are defeasibly
proved/disproved using counts-as (±∂c), and brings-
it-about antecedents are defeasibly proved/disproved
using results-in rules (±∂i). In the second case we
have to remember that a conclusion of an institutional
counts-as rule can be transformed into a results-in if
all the literals in the antecedent are defeasibly exe-
cuted.
Let us examine the above conditions at work with
the help of some examples. We assume the following
theory:
F = {αi, p, Ejq},
R = {r1 : αi, p, Ejq ⇒i s;
r2 : s⇒i r;
r3 : r ⇒c t}.
In this theory we are able to prove EIt. The facts
fire r1, thus we can prove +∂is (Eis). Now, since s
has been brought about, s is the case. We can use
this to fire the rule r2. Hence we obtain +∂ir, which
is Eir. This implies that all the requisites of r3 have
been brought about; but r3 states that r counts as t;
this means that t has been brought about, hence +∂it
and Et.
Let us replace r3 with
r′3 : p, r ⇒c t.
This time we can prove +∂ct, but not Eit (+∂it).
The reason is that p is the case without a specific
“intention” of the agent to bring about. Similarly, if
we replace r3 by
r′′3 : Eir ⇒c t
we can no longer derive Eit. In this case Eir is un-
derstood as a mere institutional fact, and not as the
successful intention of the agent to realise r in order
to realise t.
In the previous example we have seen how we can
argue in favour of Eip (for same literal p). Let us
examine the conditions to attack it. Let I be the
following institutional defeasible theory
F = {αi, p, q},
R = {r1 : αi, p⇒i s;
r2 : q ⇒c r;
r3 : p, r ⇒c ¬s}
Clearly Eis (+∂is) is not derivable from the given
theory since there is an applicable rule for ¬s. r3 is
applicable since we can derive +∂cr. Similarly, if we
replace r2 with
r′2 : q ⇒i r,
r3 is still applicable. We can prove +∂ir: this means
that there is a successful action resulting in r. In
general to discard a rule we have to show that some
of the premises cannot be derived. With a factual
literal we have to show that the literal is not the case
(or, in other terms, that there are no literals that
count as it), and that the literal is not the result of
a successful action: results of successful actions are
indeed the case. Finally we replace r3 with
r′′3 : p, r ⇒i Ejs.
Again we cannot conclude Eis; see the motivation for
the principle (EE¬E) in Section 2.
The purpose of the −∆ and−∂ inference rules is to
establish that it is not possible to prove a correspond-
ing tagged literal. These rules are defined in such a
way that all the possibilities for proving +∂p (for ex-
ample) are explored and shown to fail before −∂p can
be concluded. Thus conclusions with these tags are
the outcome of a constructive proof that the corre-
sponding positive conclusion cannot be obtained.
As a result, there is a close relationship between
the inference rules for +∂ and −∂, (and also between
those for +∆ and −∆, and +Σ and −Σ). The struc-
ture of the inference rules is the same, but the con-
ditions are negated in some sense. This feature al-
lows us to prove some properties showing the well
behaviour of defeasible logic.
Theorem 1 Let # = ∆c, ∂c,Σc,∆i, ∂i,Σi, and I be
an institutional action theory. There is no literal p
such that I ` +#p and I ` −#p.
The above theorem states that no literal is simultane-
ously provable and demonstrably unprovable, thus it
establishes the coherence of the defeasible logic pre-
sented in this paper.
Theorem 2 Let I be an institutional action theory,
and M ∈ {c, i}, i ∈ A. I ` +∂Mp and I ` +∂M∼p
iff I ` +∆Mp and I ` +∆M∼p.
This theorem gives the consistency of defeasible logic.
In particular it affirms that it is not possible to bring
conflicting states about (+∂ip and +∂i∼p) unless the
information given about the environment is itself in-
consistent. Notice, however, that the theorem does
not cover attempts (Σi). Indeed it is possible to at-
tempt something and its negation.
Let I be an institutional action theory. With ∆+c
we denote the set of literals strictly provable using
the counts-as part of I, i.e., ∆+c = {p : I ` +∆cp};
similarly for the other proof tags.
Theorem 3 For every institutional action theory I,
and M ∈ {c, i}, i ∈ A.
1. ∆+M ⊆ ∂+M ⊆ Σ+M ;
2. Σ−M ⊆ ∂−M ⊆ ∆−M ;
3. if I ` +∂iEjp then I ` −∂ip.
Since +∂i and +Σi correspond to Ei and Hi, we
have that that 1. and 2. correspond to the axiom
EiA → HiA. 3. is an immediate consequence of
clause 2.3.2 of the inference condition for +∂i. This
property corresponds to the axiom (EE¬E) of Section
2.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a modelling framework for agent
societies through the combination of an intentional
notion of institutional agency, and a (computationally
oriented) non-monotonic system (Defeasible Logic).
We have shown how to provide a sound theoreti-
cal and practical non-monotonic framework to rea-
son about the organizational notions (proclamation,
declarative power, delegation, . . . ) that constitute
the proposed model. We believe that this approach
shows potential for an intelligent and dynamic re-
source allocation protocol when one has to reason
under uncertainty and limited information which is
a typical characteristic of current organizational se-
tups.
The logic presented here is just one of the many
logics that can be defined using the main idea of the
paper (see Section 4). Non-monotonic reasoning is a
complex phenomenon with many facets. Several vari-
ants of defeasible logic have been put forward to deal
with different intuitions behind non-monotonic rea-
soning. Accordingly a designer of a defeasible logic
of agency has to chose the most appropriate defeasi-
ble inference mechanism and the degree of provability
corresponding to the modalities at hand for the in-
tended application. In a similar way the designer can
chose more or less liberal conditions to use counts-as
rules to derive brings-it-about literals. In this paper
we have assumed that we can use a counts-as rule
to derive a brings-it-about literal if all the literal in
the antecedent of the rule can be derive as results-in.
A more liberal condition could just require that only
one of them is derived in such a way.
Finally, one important question, which we could
not address here, is to embed deontic notions into our
system. Defeasible deontic logic is widely discussed in
literature (Nute 1997). How to adapt or re-frame ex-
isting models (see (Nute 1998)) in the present setting
is a matter of future research.
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